报告主题：Identity and Cooperation under One Country Two Systems
Since return of Hong Kongand Macao, China has implemented the “One Country Two Systems” practice and the bilateral cooperation between mainland China and Hong Kong / Macao has been increasing for twenty years. Under such an institution, we conducted public good game experiments at a large public university that admits Hong Kong /Macao students in the largest scale in China. We manipulate the salience of participants' natural identities in two independent public good games so as to compare, between mainland China subjects and Hong Kong/ Macao subjects, the willingness to cooperate. In the first game, when primed a common but relatively weak organization (school) identity, the average contribution amount is 47% of their endowment and it does not differ between Hong Kong/Macao students and mainland students. In the second game, when knowing specific main demographic identity of the other group member within the same organization (school), they significantly differ in cooperation levels. However, this difference is large and significant only for those who are less cooperative in the first game. We also find that mainland students reveal a stronger preference of in-group favoritism, especially for the students who are from high income families, only children and care about reunion of Taiwan.
中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院教授，在美国衣阿华州立大学获经济学博士学位。主要研究兴趣包括劳动经济学，人力资本投资，创业与企业家才能，农村发展。研究成果曾发表在American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Agricultural Economics, Economics Letters, China Economic Review 等学术期刊，并担任American Journal of Agricultural Economics;Agricultural Economics ，Health Economics; China Economic Review，《经济学季刊》和《经济理论与经济管理》等学术期刊匿名评审。