讲座主题：Exaggerating to Break-Even:Reference-Dependent Moral Hazard in Automobile Insurance Claims
主讲人简介：郑捷博士，清华大学经济管理学院经济系副教授，博士生导师，清华大学经济管理学院经济科学与政策实验室(ESPEL)常务副主任，他的研究领域包括信息经济学、产业经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学，他论文发表在American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等经济学、管理学、自然科学各领域的知名国际期刊，且有部分工作被收录入实验研究方法权威工具书Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology，并主持多项国家自然科学基金项目（结题获“特优“评价），国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主编，Research in Economics副主编，Journal of Asian Economics 客座主编，North American Journal of Economics and Finance客座主编。现为中国信息经济学会常务理事，中国微观经济理论论坛学术委员会委员，中国行为与实验经济学论坛学术委员会委员，American Committee on Asian Economic Studies执行理事。曾获"中国信息经济学2011-2015理论贡献奖"，2016-2018连续三年获"中国信息经济学青年创新奖"。
内容摘要：The effects of asymmetric information are often difficult to detect empirically, such as in insurance settings (Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie and Salanie, 2006). We demonstrate that allowing for the possibility of reference-dependent preferences can assist with this challenge. Using detailed auto insurance claims data and adopting the methodology of Allen, DeChow, Pope and Wu (2017) which studies reference-dependence in marathon finishing times, we show that policyholders exaggerate their damage claims in a manner consistent with reference-dependent moral hazard. Consistent with our theoretical model of reference-dependent claims, we find stronger reference-dependent behavior among policyholders with higher premium levels and low risk policyholders. Also consistent with the model, policyholders are more reference-dependent in their first claims than in subsequent claims, and in the second half of the coverage year compared to the first half. The detected reference point is the amount of the original premium paid - in other words, in claiming their accident damages, policyholders seek to claim back the original price of their insurance. We do not find robust patterns in the concentration of insurance claims at round number percentages greater than or less than the full premium amount, such as 90% or 110%, nor at round number nominal amounts. This implies that the unnatural claim behavior is motivated significantly by loss aversion regarding the premium paid rather than merely wanting to increase one’s claims more generally. Since damage claims can only be this precisely manipulated by the policy holder after an accident, the findings can be attributed primarily to ex-post moral hazard but not adverse selection or ex-ante moral hazard. Furthermore, the pattern exists only for individually-held policies but not corporate-held policies, which is consistent with a reference point in individual utility. Our study illustrates the potential of behavioral economics frameworks in assisting with identification challenges for classical economic problems.