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【风险管理与保险论坛(2024年度)第二讲】Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion

发布时间:2024-10-11  浏览次数: 次  来源:

讲座主题:Selective Information Sharing and Group Delusion

讲座时间:2024年10月16日(周三)下午14:00-16:00

讲座地点:沙河校区二教214

主讲人:Professor Marie Claire Villeval



主讲人简介:ProfessorMarie Claire Villeval,欧洲科学院院士,法国国家科学研究中心(CNRS)教授,里昂大学GATE-Lab负责人,法国实验经济学会创始主席,并曾任经济科学学会(ESA)主席以及法国经济学会(AFSE)主席,同时担任劳动经济研究所(IZA)研究员,因其杰出学术贡献受颁法国国家功绩骑士勋章,荣誉军团骑士勋章并获得CNRS银质奖章。Marie Claire Villeval教授主要研究领域包括实验经济学、行为经济学、劳动经济学和公共经济学,其在包括American Economic Review,Management Science, Economic Journal,Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Public Economics, PNAS等期刊发表超过125篇论文,并同时担任Management Science部门编辑,Experimental Economics顾问编辑,以及Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization荣誉编辑。

Abstract:Although they usually manage to combine information to make well-informed decisions, groups also make mistakes. We investigate experimentally one source of sub-optimal decision-making by groups: the selective and asymmetric sharing of ego-relevant information within teams. We show that good news about one’s performance is shared more often with team members than bad news. Asymmetric information sharing combined with the receivers’ selection neglect boosts team confidence compared to an unbiased exchange of feedback. Consequently, weaker teams make worse investment decisions in bets whose success depends on the team’s ability.The endogenous social exchange of ego-relevant information may foster detrimental group delusion.

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