主讲人：Marie-Claire Villeval 教授 法国国家科学研究中心（CNRS）
We theoretically show that agents with loss-averse preferences facing a decision to receive a bad financial payoff if they report honestly or to receive a better financial payoff if they report dishonestly are more likely to lie to avoid receiving the low payoff the lower the ex-ante probability of the bad outcome. This occurs due to the ex-ante expected payoff increasing as the bad outcome becomes less likely, and hence the greater the loss that can be avoided by lying. We demonstrate robust support for this role of loss aversion on lying by reanalyzing the results from the extant literature covering 74 studies and 363 treatments, and from two new experiments that vary the outcome probabilities and examine lying for personal gain and for gains to causes one supports or opposes. To measure and compare lying behavior across treatments and studies, we develop an empirical method that estimates the full distribution of dishonesty when agents privately observe the outcome of a random process and can misreport what they observed.
Marie-Claire Villeval教授是欧洲科学院院士（Academia Europaea），法国经济学会前主席和法国实验经济学会创会主席。Marie-Claire Villeval教授的研究领域包括人事经济学，实验经济学，行为经济学和神经元经济学,她的论文发表在Nature, Science, American Economic Review, Management Science, Economic Journal, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Labour Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, European Economic Review, Experimental Economics, Journal of Economic behavior & Organization等学术界顶级期刊。Marie-Claire Villeval教授目前在Management Science, Experimental Economics等多个国际顶级学术期刊担任主编和副主编，因其杰出学术贡献被法国政府授予骑士勋章。